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The draft which follows has been seen by the President and he has asked that it be transmitted to you for your comments. On receiving them we would aim to get reply off tomorrow for delivery Thursday morning in London. I do not know Whitney's plans but it occurred to me that if he was there to deliver it to Macmillan personally we might get an interesting first hand reaction which would not otherwise be available to us.

QUOTE Dear Harold:

Thank you for your letters of July 27 to which I have given careful thought. In the first place, I am inclined to agree with you that we may have reached the point where little good can come from continuing the talks at Geneva much longer. I ~~would~~ would propose that we aim at bringing them to a conclusion about the middle of next week. In any event Chris will have to leave about then to prepare for the meeting of

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the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States which convenes at Santiago, Chile, on August 12 to consider the explosive situation in the Caribbean.

The problem then is what next? The answer seems to me to depend on whether or not Gromyko will accept our position of June 16 on our rights in Berlin with provision for a reasonable moratorium period of at least two and one-half years. If he does so, I ~~will~~ would agree that the minimal requirement for progress had been met and that the way would be open for the Foreign Ministers to agree on arrangements for a Summit. Indeed, they could even pass the final decision on the length of the moratorium to the Heads of Government.

Unfortunately, my interpretation of what has happened so far at Geneva is that there has been no agreement by Gromyko on our rights formula but only a certain clarification of positions and a sharpening of the issues. This view I may say is fully shared by Chris, and he informs me that he has made this very clear to Selwyn. Therefore, barring a last-minute shift by Gromyko, which I do not entirely exclude, we are faced with an awkward situation where our minimum hope for progress has not been met. To go immediately to

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


a Summit under these conditions would run the grave risk of spectacular failure or unthinkable capitulation.

It was with this in mind that I have been ^{in communication} ~~in communication~~ with Khrushchev about a visit to the United States. It seems to me that this would be a logical next step. A ten day tour by Khrushchev through the United States might be most helpful in giving him a better picture of our strength and of our way of life, and would certainly take the crisis edge off the Berlin situation. If, as I expect would be the case, I were to follow this up with a much briefer visit to Moscow, the stage might be set for further progress at the Foreign Ministers' level which could then lead to a Summit.

Khrushchev has expressed the desire to rest during August so I would envision his visit here taking place in mid-September with my return visit to ^{Moscow} ~~Moscow~~ booked for October. That would open the way toward a Summit some time in November or early December. I recognize of course that Adenauer and to a lesser extent de Gaulle might have some concern about such an exchange of visits. Therefore, I would propose to come to Paris for a Western Summit some time before Khrushchev's arrival here. This would also give me a long

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overdue opportunity to talk out some of our problems with de Gaulle. I would think that such a schedule would fully meet your preoccupations for the next three months. It would take the edge off the crisis and enhance the prospect of useful talks at the Summit.

I realize of course that there is a chance that Gromyko may suddenly give us what we want at Geneva. I had hoped that my exchanges with Khrushchev would lead to just this result. He must realize that his reception here would be far better if there had been at least a minimum of progress at Geneva. If we do have this helpful development, I would still think it desirable to adhere to my proposal to hold the Summit meeting in November preferably in Quebec. This would enable me to talk with Khrushchev in the meantime and to do whatever I can to assure that his attitude during a Summit meeting is based on a maximum understanding of our Western attitudes, power, and resources. I don't want to overestimate the value of my conversations with and the impact on him of an exposure to the people and facts of life in this country. Nevertheless, I cannot help but believe that the effect might be considerable and it might promote the very result at the Summit which you and I are so eager to achieve. This would be in line with your thinking, as I remember

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it, incident to your own visit to Moscow.

However, if we should get an unexpectedly favorable reaction from Gromyko in the next few days, and if you feel that it is important to you to get the Summit over with before September 10th, I will of course instruct Chris to join Selwyn in trying to work out such arrangements at Geneva. As you remember, one of the tasks assigned the Foreign Ministers was to arrange the date and place for a Summit Meeting once they had made adequate progress on substantive issues. I think we must stick to this arrangement and not face either our friends or Khrushchev with a sudden "invitation" from me.

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Apart from the substantive considerations, there remains the risk of leakage. I would hope that this ~~matter~~ matter could be held most securely for a few days to permit determination of the Russian attitude at Geneva. END QUOTE.

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